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Objective: Cognitive models suggest that the self-concept of persons with psychosis
can be fundamentally affected. Self-concepts were found to be related to different
symptom domains when measured concurrently. Longitudinal investigations to
disentangle the possible causal associations are rare.
Method: We examined a sample of 160 people with a diagnosis of schizophrenia who
took part in a psychotherapy study. All participants had the DSM-IV diagnosis of a
schizophrenia and pronounced negative symptoms. Neurocognition, symptoms, and
self-concepts were assessed at two time points 12 months apart. Structural equation
modeling was used to test whether symptoms influence self-concepts (scar-model) or
self-concepts affect symptoms (vulnerability model).
Results: Negative symptoms correlated concurrently with self-concepts. Neurocognitive
deficits are associated with more negative self-concepts 12 months later. Interpersonal
self-concepts were found to be relevant for paranoia.
Conclusion: The findings implicate that if deficits in neurocognition are present,
fostering a positive self-concept should be an issue in therapy. Negative interpersonal
self-concept indicates an increased risk for paranoid delusions in the course of 1
year. New aspects for cognitive models in schizophrenia and clinical implications are
discussed.
Keywords: cognitive models, structural equation modeling, self-esteem, psychological model, self-schema
Introduction
In cognitive models of paranoid delusions and negative symptoms negative self-concepts in terms
of reduced self-eﬃcacy, self-acceptance, self-esteem, and expectancies for pleasure play a major
role (Rector et al., 2005; Kesting and Lincoln, 2013). Self-concepts integrate cognitive, emotional,
and motivational reﬂections of the self. For the emotional aspect, self-esteem, as an evaluative
self-concept, is a prominent factor as well as an important outcome in mental health research. Self-
concepts are central to the health care of people with schizophrenic psychoses as a core element
of quality of life (Weinberg et al., 2012) as well as a potential mediator between treatment and
outcome. Self-esteem in schizophrenia was found to be linked to depression (Cavelti et al., 2012a),
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quality of life (Staring et al., 2009), functional outcomes (Vracotas
et al., 2012), negative symptoms (Palmier-Claus et al., 2011a), and
positive symptoms (Barrowclough et al., 2003; Thewissen et al.,
2011).
The relationship between symptoms and self-concepts are
typically discussed in two ways (Klein et al., 2011). First,
negative self-concepts can be regarded as vulnerability for higher
symptom severity as the capability for coping with stressful
events might be reduced (Zubin and Spring, 1977; Bentall et al.,
1994). Second, symptoms might induce negative changes in the
self-concepts, which may be considered as a scar (Lewinsohn
et al., 1981). The ideas of the vulnerability and the scar model
are summarized graphically in Figure 1. In a meta-analysis of
77 studies with representative, non-representative, and clinical
samples the vulnerability model showed stronger eﬀects than the
scar model for depression (Sowislo and Orth, 2013).
Although the course of self-concepts and symptoms has
been studied extensively in depressive disorders, evidence
is scarce in psychotic disorders. Most available studies
refer to the development and course of paranoia. Cognitive
models state that dysfunctional self-concepts contribute to
paranoid delusions (Bentall et al., 1994; Garety et al., 2001;
Freeman et al., 2002). Recent clinical (Thewissen et al.,
2011), non-clinical (Thewissen et al., 2008), and experimental
evidence (Palmier-Claus et al., 2011b; Kesting et al., 2013)
elucidated the association between self-concepts and positive
symptoms, especially paranoid delusions. Particularly the
relationship between self-esteem, stigma, insight, depression,
and positive symptoms has been studied comprehensively
(Lysaker et al., 2007; Cavelti et al., 2012b; Erickson and
Lysaker, 2012). In their review regarding this topic, Kesting
and Lincoln (2013) concluded that negative interpersonal
self-concepts and low self-esteem can lead to persecutory
delusions.
Neurocognition is a reliable predictor of functional outcome
(Green et al., 2000; Bowie et al., 2010). These cognitive
dysfunctions are relative stable through the course of the
illness and are merely unaﬀected by medication (Harvey and
Keefe, 2001). Neurocognitive deﬁcits are even present in ﬁrst-
episode populations (Reichenberg et al., 2009). Verbal memory
performance is enhanced in the year after remission of positive
symptoms but performance levels remain impaired (Wittorf
et al., 2004). The same picture is shown for high-risk patients; the
FIGURE 1 | Theoretical model integrating the scar and the vulnerability
model at two time points (t0 and t1); adapted from Sowislo and Orth
(2013).
deﬁcits are viable before onset, but improve over time (Bora and
Murray, 2014). Intensiﬁed programs of cognitive remediation can
yield to better cognitive performance and functioning (Wykes
et al., 2011; Sanchez et al., 2014).
In the cognitive model of negative symptoms, defeatist
beliefs are related to symptoms like avolition, anhedonia, and
aﬀective ﬂattening (Rector et al., 2005). Some studies conﬁrmed
these associations between self-reported expectancies about
competences, success, or acceptance, and observer-rated negative
symptoms (Grant and Beck, 2009). In the same study the authors
found that defeatist beliefs about oneself mediate the association
between neurocognition and functional outcome, supporting
the scar model for neurocognition. Furthermore, interpersonal
self-concepts and self-esteem correlated with negative symptoms
(Lincoln et al., 2011). Palmier-Claus et al. (2011b) reported
data supporting the vulnerability model for negative symptoms
in early psychosis. In their study, the change in self-concepts
predicted the course of negative symptoms.
Self-concepts can play a substantial role for subjective well
being and for recovery. Especially self-esteem and self-eﬃcacy
have been pointed out as important personal traits within
the recovery process (Yanos and Moos, 2007). Self-concepts
are targets in narrative enhancement therapy (Yanos et al.,
2011), schema-therapy (Bortolon et al., 2013), meta cognitive
therapy (Moritz et al., 2014), and acceptance, and commitment
therapy (Gaudiano andHerbert, 2006). Especially in the narrative
enhancement therapy fragmented self-narratives and self-stigma
are targeted. These approaches could enrich cognitive behavioral
therapy for psychosis (Tai and Turkington, 2009) as well as
self-concepts could give a new focus for family interventions
(Hesse et al., 2015; Yesufu-Udechuku et al., 2015).
In the present study, our purpose was to examine the
plausibility of the scar and vulnerability models regarding the
clinically most signiﬁcant areas of symptoms and neurocognition
in people with schizophrenic psychosis. First, we expected
that all symptom domains, including neurocognitive deﬁcits,
are associated with self-concepts. Second, we expected to
ﬁnd further evidence for the vulnerability eﬀect referring to




The original sample comprised 198 outpatients who participated
in a randomized controlled trial for the treatment of negative
symptoms with cognitive behavioral therapy in three University
Hospitals (TONES-study, ISRCTN25455020; Klingberg et al.,
2009, 2011). All participants gave written informed consent.
The study was conducted in accordance with the Declaration
of Helsinki and the guidelines of the local University ethics
committees (Tuebingen, Frankfurt, and Duesseldorf). The
DSM-IV diagnosis of schizophrenia was conﬁrmed by a
structured clinical interview (SCID-I). Assessment of symptoms
was performed by trained raters. The inclusion and exclusion
criteria are reported in detail in the study protocol (Klingberg
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et al., 2009). Study participants had to have at least moderate
negative symptoms and no severe depressive (PANNS G07,
depression ≥6) or severe positive symptoms [any item of the
standard PANSS positive scale (P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6, P7) ≥6].
The study population represents a more homogenous subgroup
of people diagnosed with schizophrenia, than a random or
unselected sample. A little loss of data (19%) occurred due to
reward given for ratings to all participants and external data
monitoring. We analyzed data of 160 participants whose follow-
up data (12 months) were available. Missing data were imputed
with expectation-maximization imputation models.
Measures and Latent Variable Construction
We grouped indicators to ﬁve latent constructs and tested
the measurement adequacy empirically (Klingberg et al., 2006;
Nuechterlein et al., 2008; Kim et al., 2012; Khan et al., 2013). As
indicators of a latent construct may diﬀer in the degree to which
they represent the latent construct, we examined factor loadings
as a measure of the strength of association between the indicator
and the construct.
Negative symptoms were measured by the Positive and
Negative Symptom Scale (PANSS) and the Scale for the Assessment
of Negative Symptoms (SANS).The corresponding factor loadings
to the negative symptoms factors in our analyses can be
considered as high (0.86–0.96), respectively.
Paranoia was measured by the “delusions” item from the
PANSS (item P1) and the “vsuspiciousness/persecution” item
from the PANSS (item P6). The factor loadings ranged from 0.51
to 0.84.
Two domains of neurocognition, verbal recall and processing
speed, were selected as particularly relevant. The Trail Making
Test (TMT) consists of two parts, one (part A) measures
mainly processing speed. Verbal memory was measured by
the Verbaler Lern und Merkfähigkeitstest Test (VLMT). The
two tests represent two diﬀerent domains of neurocognitive
functioning, therefore lower factor loadings were expected. For
sake of content validity of the factor we decided to keep verbal
memory in the construct. The factor loadings of the tests ranged
from 0.41 to 0.81, indicating that verbal memory is not as
well represented in the neurocognitive functioning construct as
processing speed.
Self-concepts were assessed with the Frankfurt Self-Concept
Scales (FSKN; Deusinger, 1986). This inventory comprises 10
one-dimensional scales with speciﬁc self-concepts concerning
relevant aspects of the self. The internal consistency of the
scales was highly satisfactory (α = 0.93–0.97; n = 1794).
The questionnaire has been used in psychosis research
frequently (Lincoln et al., 2010, 2011; Wittorf et al., 2010).
We used six subscales for our analysis, three to measure
positive self-concept, and three to measure interpersonal
self-concept.
The self-concepts “general achievement,” “solving daily
problems,” and “self-esteem” were used to measure positive self-
concept. The factor loadings of these subscales ranged from
0.88 to 0.93. Interpersonal self-concept was measured with three
subscales from the FSKN: “valued by others,” “ability to make
contact with other people “and” emotions and relations to
others.” The factor loadings of these subscales ranged from 0.59
to 0.86.
Statistical Analysis
First we checked if the two psychotherapeutic interventions
to which patients were allocated in the RCT have any
signiﬁcant diﬀerential treatment eﬀect on the variables of
interest. Analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was conducted
with t1 as the dependent and t0 and treatment group as
independent variables for each symptom and self-concept.
We used structural equation modeling (SEM) techniques to
test the main hypotheses of longitudinal associations. SEM is
a conﬁrmative technique allowing the construction of latent
variables by observed indicators and testing the relations between
the latent constructs.
We examined the vulnerability model and the scar model
for diﬀerent symptoms and self-concepts comparing estimates
of strength of association and ﬁt indexes. In a preparatory
investigation of assumptions of SEM both skewness and kurtosis
of the modeled indicators were within acceptable limits (Kline,
2011). A total of six longitudinal models were deﬁned using
data from baseline (t0) and 12-months follow-up (t1) with
combinations of the two areas of self-concepts (positive self-
concept and interpersonal self-concept) and three symptom
domains (paranoia, negative symptoms, and neurocognition).
We allowed autocorrelations between indicators over time.When
Heywood cases (negative error variances) occurred, problematic
autocorrelations have been ﬁxed at 0. For each self-concept-
symptom pair, an unrestricted model including all paths and thus
allowing for both scar and vulnerability eﬀects was estimated.
Subsequently, partly restricted models omitting one path each
representing the vulnerability or the scar model were ﬁt,
respectively. Finally, a fully restricted model excluding both scar
and vulnerability eﬀects was estimated.
All analyses were performed with AMOS and SPSS (Version
21.0. Armonk, NY: IBM Corporation).
Results
The ANCOVAs for diﬀerential eﬀects of the interventions
resulted in no signiﬁcant (P < 0.05) diﬀerence between the two
groups for any reported variable. Therefore the treatment group
was not considered in further analyses. Anyway, we report in the
appendix on models incorporating the group factor to rule out
inﬂuence of treatment.
The mean scores and SD for all variables are summarized in
Table 1. The sample comprised only a few ﬁrst-episode patients,
and the majority was male. Level of occupation and of general
functioning indicates that the sample was moderately to severely
impaired. The sample is characterized by rather weak positive
symptoms and moderate to severe negative symptoms. The mean
results in the VLMT are about one SD lower than the results in an
age-matched normative sample (M = 52.27, SD= 7.84; Lux et al.,
1999). The time needed to complete the TMT A is more than
one SD above the mean in the age-matched normative sample
(M = 28.54, SD = 10.09; Tombaugh, 2004).
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TABLE 1 | Demographic and clinical characteristics of the sample.
t0 (Baseline) t1 (12 months)
Frequency Percent
Female 66 41
High school 84 52
Occupation 44 28
Married/with partner 65 41
Adverse child events 31 19
First episode 11 7
Mean SD Mean SD
Age (years) 36.90 9.83
Age at first psychiatric symptom
(years)
23.77 8.74
GAF (score) 59.58 8.91 63.34 11.47
Verbal IQ 108.72 16.72
PANSS
PANSS P01 (item score) 1.89 1.00 2.06 1.23
PANSS P06 (item score) 2.00 0.91 1.94 1.07
PANSS MNS (mean item score) 3.02 0.80 2.58 0.90
SANS (mean score) 2.01 0.65 1.69 0.78
TMT A (section) 38.68 15.71 33.59 14.11
VLMT learning (sum words) 45.16 10.66 46.69 11.79
FSKN
General achievement (FSGA) 3.51 0.90 3.70 0.90
Solving daily problems (FSSP) 3.65 0.81 3.78 0.82
Self-esteem (FSSE) 3.68 1.05 3.95 0.99
Valued by others (FSVO) 3.69 0.99 3.87 1.03
Ability to make contact (FSAC) 3.73 0.84 3.91 0.78
Emotions and relationships (FSEO) 3.80 0.82 3.75 0.78
N = 160; Occupation, Fulltime occupation or education; GAF, Global Assessment
of Functioning, PANSS P01, delusions; P06, suspiciousness/persecution; MNS,
modified negative symptom scale; SANS, Scale for the Assessment of Negative
Symptoms; TMT A, Trail Making Test Trail A; VLMT, Verbaler Lern und
Merkfähigkeitstest; FSKN, Frankfurt Self-Concept Scales.
Negative symptoms were the ﬁrst domain to be tested with
regard to the vulnerability and the scar model. The ﬁt of
all models is good. The restricted model, omitting the paths
representing the vulnerability and the scar model, does not
signiﬁcantly impact the model ﬁt. The goodness of ﬁt statistics
are summarized in Table 2. Negative symptoms were fairly
stable over time as indicated by a standardized coeﬃcient of
0.66. Whereas the correlation between negative symptoms and
positive self-concept was −0.32 at t0, it increased marginally to
−0.44 at t1. The test of models with negative symptoms and
interpersonal self-concepts result in similar results as shown
in Table 2. Incorporating treatment group in the model (see
Supplementary Figure S1), did not change these results. In
summary, for negative symptoms our data did not support either
the scar or the vulnerability model.
With regard to neurocognition, the scar model was identiﬁed
as the best model both for positive and interpersonal self-
concepts. These results are presented in Table 2 and Figure 2.
Neurocognition is highly stable over time indicated by a high
auto-regression coeﬃcient. The standardized coeﬃcient from
neurocognition at baseline to positive self-concept at follow-
up representing the scar model is 0.26 with p = 0.008. In
nested model comparison for positive self-concept, the diﬀerence
between the restricted model and the scar model is signiﬁcant,
indicating a substantially increased model ﬁt for the scar
model than for the restricted model (df = 1; X2 = 10.24;
p = 0.001). For interpersonal self-concepts the same pattern
is depicted; the scar path coeﬃcient (0.25; p > 0.019) and the
diﬀerence to the restricted model are both signiﬁcant (df = 1;
X2 = 5.80; p = 0.016). When treatment group is added to the
model (see Supplementary Figure S2), the relationship between
neurocognition at t0 and positive self-concept in t1 remains
signiﬁcant (p = 0.008). In summary, for neurocognition the data
supported the scar hypothesis.
For paranoia, the vulnerability model showed better ﬁtting
indices. The unrestricted model for interpersonal self-concepts
is presented in Figure 3. Whereas the concurrent correlation
between paranoia and self-concepts is −0.44 at baseline, it
decreases to −0.27 12 months later. The stability of paranoia
is smaller than for negative symptoms or neurocognition with
a standardized coeﬃcient of 0.31. The standardized coeﬃcient
from interpersonal self-concept at baseline to paranoia at follow-
up representing the vulnerability model is −0.25 with p < 0.029.
Moreover the chi-square statistics of the vulnerability model
ﬁts signiﬁcantly superior than the restricted model (df = 1;
X2 = 4.60; p = 0.032). Although the results were fairly
comparable for the models with positive self-concept, the
coeﬃcient representing the vulnerability model did not reach
the threshold for strict statistical signiﬁcance (p < 0.097). As
well, the chi-square statistics between the vulnerability model
and the restricted model did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly, indicating
no signiﬁcant incremental ﬁt for the vulnerability model with
positive self-concepts.(df = 1; X2 = 2.17; p = 0.141). When
treatment group is added to the model (see Supplementary
Figure S3), the relationship between paranoid delusions at t0 and
interpersonal self-concept in t1 remains signiﬁcant (p = 0.031).
In summary, for paranoia the data supported the vulnerability
model, particularly with regard to interpersonal self-concept.
Discussion
Cognitive models on negative symptoms, positive symptoms,
and neurocognition can inform treatment development as they
shed light on the development and maintenance of symptoms
(Garety et al., 2001, 2007; Freeman et al., 2002; Rector et al., 2005;
Kesting and Lincoln, 2013). In order to obtain a robust evidence
base, these models need to be tested by diﬀerent methodologies
including epidemiological studies (Krabbendam et al., 2002;
Fowler et al., 2006), experimental data with healthy controls, or
clinical samples (Kesting et al., 2013), as well as longitudinal data
from clinical samples like the study presented in this article.
Negative Symptoms
Cognitive models of negative symptoms (Rector et al., 2005)
as well as the psychotherapeutic rationale (Staring et al.,
2013) rely on defeatist beliefs and negative self-concepts. Most
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TABLE 2 | Goodness-of-fit indices of the tested models and model comparisons.
Chi-sq Chi-sq/df CFI TLI RMSEA BIC AIC Coefficient (SE; P)
Threshold for good models n.a. ≤2 ≥0.950 ≥0.950 ≤0.050 l.v.p. l.v.p. P < 0.05
Negative Symptoms
Positive self-concept
Unrestricted model (df = 26) 22.05; P = 0.63 0.882 1.000 1.004 0.000 174.31 82.05
Scar model (df = 27) 22.18; P = 0.68 0.853 1.000 1.005 0.000 169.36 80.18 −0.10 (0.07; 0.128)
Vulnerability model (df = 27) 24.35; P = 0.56 0.937 1.000 1.002 0.000 171.53 82.35 0.02 (0.08; 0.719)
Restricted model (df = 28) 24.39; P = 0.61 0.903 1.000 1.003 0.000 166.50 80.39
Interpersonal self-concept
Unrestricted model (df = 26) 25.78; P = 0.42 1.031 0.999 0.999 0.014 178.03 85.78
Scar model (df = 27) 27.17; P = 0.40 1.045 0.999 0.998 0.017 174.35 85.17 −0.08 (0.08; 0.232)
Vulnerability model (df = 27) 25.78; P = 0.48 0.992 1.000 1.000 0.000 172.96 83.78 0.01 (0.08; 0.943)
Restricted model (df = 28) 27.18; P = 0.45 1.007 1.000 1.000 0.006 169.28 83.18
Neurocognition
Positive self-concept
Unrestricted model (df = 26) 27.54; P = 0.28 1.145 0.997 0.995 0.030 184.87 89.54
Scar model (df = 27) 27.90; P = 0.31 1.116 0.998 0.996 0.027 180.16 87.90 0.26 (0.02; 0.008)
Vulnerability model (df = 27) 38.00; P = 0.05 1.520 0.989 0.981 0.057 190.25 97.99 −0.05 (0.63; 0.563)
Restricted model (df = 28) 38.14; P = 0.06 1.467 0.990 0.983 0.054 185.32 96.14
Interpersonal self-concept
Unrestricted model (df = 26) 25.63; P = 0.37 1.125 0.998 0.996 0.020 183.91 87.63
Scar model (df = 27) 26.43; P = 0.39 1.096 0.998 0.997 0.019 179.61 86.43 0.25 (0.02; 0.02)
Vulnerability model (df = 27) 31.54; P = 0.17 1.218 0.992 0.985 0.040 184.72 91.54 −0.07 (0.80; 0.39)
Restricted model (df = 28) 32.27; P = 0.19 1.195 0.992 0.987 0.038 180.31 90.24
Paranoia
Positive self-concept
Unrestricted model (df = 26) 28.57; P = 0.24 1.191 0.996 0.992 0.035 185.90 90.57
Scar model (df = 27) 31.21; P = 0.18 1.248 0.994 0.990 0.040 183.46 91.20 0.03 (0.07; 0.714)
Vulnerability model (df = 27) 28.70; P = 0.28 1.148 0.997 0.994 0.030 180.95 88.70 −0.18 (0.15; 0.097)
Restricted model (df = 28) 31.30; P = 0.22 1.204 0.995 0.992 0.036 178.48 89.30
Interpersonal self-concept
Unrestricted model (df = 26) 29.41; P = 0.21 1.225 0.992 0.985 0.038 186.74 91.41
Scar model (df = 27) 34.02; P = 0.11 1.361 0.987 0.976 0.048 186.28 94.02 0.01 (0.08; 0.904)
Vulnerability model (df = 27) 29.42; P = 0.25 1.117 0.994 0.988 0.033 181.68 89.42 −0.25 (0.14; 0.029)
Restricted model (df = 28) 34.03; P = 0.13 1.309 0.988 0.980 0.044 181.21 92.03
Chi-sq, discrepancy chi-squared statistic; df, degrees of freedom; Chi-sq/df, normed chi-squared statistic; Coefficient, the standardized estimates in the unrestricted
model; SE, Standard error of the coefficient; P, significance level of the coefficient; CFI, Comparative Fit Index; TLI, Tucker-Lewis Index; RMSEA, Root Mean Squared
Error of Approximation; BIC, Bayes Information Criterion; l.v.p., lower values preferred (only for model comparisons).
studies use measures of defeatist attitudes and expectancies
such as measured by the dysfunctional attitude scale (Beck
et al., 2013). In our study, negative symptoms were associated
concurrently with self-concepts as predicted by the cognitive
model of negative symptoms. Contrary to our expectation,
self-concept at pre-treatment did not predict negative symptoms
after 12 months. The construct of negative symptoms has been
stable, thus there was change in individuals and in the mean,
but relative low change in the individual residuals. However,
the longitudinal analysis did not support an inﬂuence, like
found in ﬁrst-episode patients (Palmier-Claus et al., 2011a).
As in our study the time between t0 and t1 was 12 months,
multiple causation might have inﬂuenced negative symptoms
as well as self-concepts during this period. The variance in
our sample is limited due to the inclusion criteria; this might
have limited the covariances as well. For further research
a shorter duration of measurement intervals is supposed to
test.
Neurocognition
As hypothesized, neurocognitive functioning at baseline
predicted positive self-concept after 12months. Yet, self-concepts
are not in the focus of interest in research on neurocognition in
people with psychosis. In the general population there is strong
evidence that people can estimate their cognitive abilities well
(Freund and Kasten, 2012). Our ﬁndings support the scar model.
Possibly service-users perceive the loss of memory function
and processing speed during the course of the disorder and
integrate them in a negative self-concept. In concurrent analyses
of people with schizophrenia, defeatist beliefs operated as a
mediator between neurocognitive impairments and negative
symptoms (Grant and Beck, 2009). These results demonstrate
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FIGURE 2 | Unrestricted longitudinal model of Positive Self-concept
and Neurocognition. Rectangles indicate observed indicator variables.
Ovals indicate unobserved latent variables. Figures on single-headed arrows
indicate standardized regression weights; figures on double-headed arrows
correlations. Error variables are omitted. TMT A, Trail Making Test Trail A;
(VLMT) Verbaler Lern und Merkfähigkeitstest; Frankfurt Self-Concept Scales:
(FSGA, general achievement; FSSP, solving daily problems; FSSE,
self-esteem). The overall model fit was χ2 = 27.538, df = 24, P < 0.280;
CFI = 0.997, TLI = 0.995, RMSEA = 0.030 (0.000 – 0.074).
FIGURE 3 | Unrestricted longitudinal model of interpersonal
self-concept and paranoia. Rectangles indicate observed indicator
variables. Ovals indicate unobserved latent variables. Figures on
single-headed arrows indicate standardized regression weights; figures on
double-headed arrows correlations. Error variables are omitted. Pos1, PANNS
P01 delusions; Pos06, PANSS P6 suspiciousness/persecution; Frankfurt
Self-Concept Scales: (FSVO, valued by others; FSAC, ability to make contact
with other people, FSEO, emotions and relations to others). The overall model
fit was χ2 = 29.41, df = 24, P = 0.21; CFI = 0.992, TLI = 0.985,
RMSEA = 0.038 (0.000 – 0.078).
the importance of functional illness-concepts. In a cross-
sectional model of visual perception, social cognition, and social
functioning the same mediating eﬀect of negative beliefs about
the self was found (Green et al., 2012). It is plausible that more
negative self-concepts may lead to negative symptoms due
to the perception of neurocognitive deﬁcits and maladaptive
illness-concepts.
Paranoid Delusions
In our study, evidence was found for a prediction of paranoia
after 12 months by interpersonal self-concept at pre-treatment.
Other researchers yielded empirical support for the vulnerability
model in paranoid delusions was as well (Fowler et al., 2012;
Kesting and Lincoln, 2013). For example, in daily life reports
of ﬂuctuations in self-esteem predicted the development of
paranoia (Thewissen et al., 2008). Some cross-sectional studies
found positive correlations between self-concepts and positive
symptoms (Barrowclough et al., 2003) or paranoid delusions
(Smith et al., 2006). In the data presented above the stability
of paranoid delusions was weak, primarily indicating that most
people involved in this trial had only modest paranoid delusions
at entry but some of them relapsed in the course of the study.
The scales “negative self ” and “negative others” of the Brief
Core Schema Scale (BCSS; Fowler et al., 2006) have shown
positive correlations with paranoid delusions (Freeman et al.,
2013; Garety et al., 2013). There is a slight diﬀerence between
the “negative others” scale in the BCSS and the interpersonal
self-concepts measured in the FSKN. Whereas the BCSS assesses
appraised threat from others, the items used in our study are
formulated as self-concepts, i.e., how the person is thinking about
itself in social relationships. The three scales which has been
used to measure interpersonal self-concepts reﬂect the feelings of
being valued by others, trustworthy for others and competent in
making contacts. In the BCSS one item is for instance: “Other
people are supportive,” whereas in the FSKN a corresponding
inverted item is “With many of my friends, I’m afraid that when I
need them they won’t be there for me.” In our study, the more
global positive self-concepts did not support the vulnerability
model; the path from positive self-concept at baseline to paranoia
at follow-up did not reach statistical signiﬁcance. The long
interval of 12 months, the limited variance in paranoia and
the sample size may have caused these non-signiﬁcant ﬁndings.
Lincoln et al. (2010) found although that paranoia was not
associated with self-esteem but with interpersonal self-concepts.
In our study, interpersonal self-concepts predicted paranoia
too, hence when psychological models of paranoia are studied,
interpersonal self-concepts in addition to more general positive,
or negative self-concepts should be considered. Bentall et al.
(2001) have hypothesized that people with tendencies to paranoid
delusions avoid negative beliefs about the self, by attributing
threatening events to other persons. Interpersonal self-concepts
could reﬂect not only the self though how we see ourselves in
social context and how we see other people in relation to us. Our
ﬁndings support the model of persecutory delusions of Garety
et al. (2001) and Freeman et al. (2002) who proposed that certain
beliefs about the self and others are important factors in the
development of persecutory delusions.
Clinical Implications
There may be some clinical implications for our ﬁndings,
assuming that cognitive behavioral therapy for psychosis is an
eﬀective treatment, one mechanism of change could be the
improvement of self-concepts. Interpersonal self-concepts could
be inﬂuenced by the quality of the therapeutic alliance in
psychotherapy, which is indeed a common eﬀect in the treatment
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of schizophrenia (Frank and Gunderson, 1990) as well as in every
therapeutic intervention (Martin et al., 2000). We can speculate
that in many therapeutic settings interpersonal self-concepts are
inﬂuenced as the therapeutic relationship might be a positive
model in terms of trustworthiness, reliability, and acceptance.
The possible change in the interpersonal self-concept due to the
therapy could be one explanation for the reduction in positive
symptoms in supportive therapies (Penn et al., 2004) and for
symptom changes during therapy even when they are not directly
addressed. When neurocognitive deﬁcits are seen in people with
schizophrenia, interventions aiming at compensating deﬁcits
and modifying dysfunctional attitudes and self-concepts could
be helpful in reducing negative performance expectancies and
negative symptoms. When neurocognitive deﬁcits are present,
minimizing the deﬁcits is crucial and partly possible (Wykes
et al., 2011). The awareness of cognitive impairments is negatively
correlated with self-esteem (Cella et al., 2014), therefore when
neurocognition does not remit, service-users should be helped
in accepting and destigmatizing limits caused by symptoms. For
this purpose psychological interventions could be helpful, like
combinations of cognitive therapy, and cognitive remediation
(Greenwood et al., 2005; Wykes et al., 2011). For this purpose
cognitive intervention could focus more on interpersonal self-
concepts and narrative enhancements (Yanos et al., 2011) to
protect people with schizophrenia from relapse to paranoid
delusions.
Strengths and Limitations
A main strength of our study is that patients have been
investigated and followed-up over a period of 12 months. From
the 198 patients interviewed at baseline we had almost complete
data from 160 participants 12 months later, indicating a low
risk of bias due to informative censoring. Whereas other studies
showed eﬀects for some hours (Thewissen et al., 2008) up to
9 months (Fowler et al., 2012), in our analysis the interval was
12 months. The relatively small coeﬃcients have to be interpreted
in this context.
There are some limitations in the study. First, the study is part
of randomized controlled trial with systematic therapy regime.
We tried to rule out inﬂuences from treatment statistically;
anyway a sample without explicit psychotherapy would be more
adequate to test the hypotheses. Second, the tested models had
to be simple, because the sample size of 160 participants limits
more complex structural equation models (e.g., a single model
including all tested constructs and associations simultaneously).
Furthermore, our sample consists of patients with predominantly
negative symptoms and relatively weak positive symptoms, and
thus might limit the possibility of generalization. On the other
hand a strength of the study is to include a relative large sample of
people with distinct inclusion criteria and a relative homogenous
phenotype. Neurocognition as measured in this study consisted
only of verbal memory and processing speed, other important
domains like executive functions or verbal ﬂuency were not
included. We had other measures in the dataset available, but we
could not reach appropriate model ﬁts when including measures
of attention and problem solving. Nevertheless we included two
good established markers for neurocognition in our analysis. The
Hopkins Verbal Learning Test (a similar verbal learning test as we
used) and the TMT are included in the MATRICS-Battery, both
are correlated with functioning and have the highest ratings for
practicability by experts (Nuechterlein et al., 2008).
Conclusion
We found some evidence for the importance of self-concepts
in the course of symptoms in people with schizophrenia. We
could ﬁnd evidence for the scar model in neurocognition: global
positive self-concepts as well as interpersonal self-concepts seem
to be endangered when neurocognitive impairments occur. This
study provides further evidence for a vulnerability model of
paranoia: the presence of a negative interpersonal self-concept
is a risk factor for paranoid delusions. This result is consistent
with theories proposing a relationship between negative social
experiences, mood, self-concepts, and paranoia (Garety et al.,
2001; Freeman, 2007; Kesting and Lincoln, 2013).
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